History # Revision: When rattled Pakistan began invading Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 (Article 5)
| 23-Nov-2022 |
We are proceeding article number four here which was about relief operations in Jammu and Kashmir by the Indian government in the wake of Pakistani invasion of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947.
AIR ACTION
Royal Indian Air Force detachments at Srinagar and Amritsar carried out offensive reconnaissances of enemy-held areas and also dropped ammunition and supplies for the beleaguered State garrisons. On 3 November, Spitfires and Harvards from Srinagar reconnoitred Kotli area and successfully attacked several enemy positions. A fire was started at one of the enemy positions as a result of this attack. On the same day, two Tempests from Amritsar carried out offensive reconnaissance of area Kotli. One enemy machine gun position south-east of Kotli was attacked and knocked out. Concentration of enemy troops was also strafed.
The raiders, however, scored a notable success on this day, for Mendhar fell into their hands and the threat to Poonch town became more imminent. Two Tempests operating from Amritsar were over Kotli at 0930 hours on 5 November for an offensive reconnaissance. Acting on ground signs displayed by the isolated State Force garrison, the pilots strafed and fired rockets at enemy positions north and west of Kotli.
Later at 1245 hours, another pair of Tempests from the same base attacked more enemy positions further west of Kotli. A number of huts occupied by enemy forces were the main target; four rockets and nearly 1000 rounds of 20 mm shell were expended. Rawalkot appeared to be quiet and the State forces did not call for any offensive action. Similar air sorties were carried out on 6 November also.
On 7 November, Kotli reported all types of ammunition exhausted and appealed for air drop of supplies. A similar request was received from Mirpur. Three Harvards took off from Srinagar at 0900 hours to drop ammunition and medical supplies at Bagh and Rawalkot. No drop was made at Bagh, as the village was found being looted and set ablaze.
The looters took cover on the approach of the aircraft. Supplies were successfully dropped at Rawalkot, but in doing so one aircraft was shot up from the ground by the enemy in the vicinity. As a result the pilot had to make a forced landing at 1030 hours about 270 metres south-west of Punch town in a river bed. One Tempest operating from Amritsar attacked enemy positions at Kotli and Rawalkot. Two hundred and fifty 20 mm cannon shells were expended in these attacks. On the same day the hostiles attacked Jhangar camp, but were repulsed.
On 9 November, Tempests from Amritsar operated over Baramulla-Domel and Poonch area. Four sorties were flown during the day. Enemy positions were attacked at Palandri and west and north- west of Kohli. Rawalkot was found covered with smoke from burning houses. On 10 November Spitfires from Srinagar paid special attention to the Kotli area. Houses indicated by the State forces were attacked with bombs. On the same day the garrison at Bagh along with the refugees managed to withdraw to Poonch.
On 11 November the Tempests took off from Amritsar and hovered over Kotli, Rawalkot, Bagh and Poonch. Rawalkot and Bagh appeared deserted. Cannon fire and a few rockets were delivered at the enemy near Kotli. One Dakota dropped supplies successfully over Poonch at 1300 hours on the same day, On 12 November the Spitfires attacked Kotli area again with 250-lb bombs.
THE LIGHTS GROW DIM
The situation, however, had been steadily worsening. Rajauri had been captured by the enemy. The number of non-Muslims killed, wounded and abducted was reported to be 30,000. About fifteen hundred refugees at Chingas were also reported to have been slaughtered. Jhangar was besieged and Naushahra was threatened, The State troops evacuated Rawalkot and arrived at Poonch with 6000 refugees. The tiny garrison at Beri Pattan was attacked and the bridge damaged.
The morale of the garrison at Mirpur was very low on account of heavy enemy pressure. The garrison at Kotli, which had been attacked repeatedly by the raiders, was facing a desperate situation. The sands were fast running out and the lights were growing dim. In sheer desperation Mehr Chand Mahajan made a last moving appeal on 12 November to the Defence Minister of India to come to the rescue of the doomed populace of the Jammu Province. It was a race against time.
Another day was to pass before Uri fell to the Indian forces and the threat to the Jhelum valley was averted. Then and then alone was it possible to rush reinforcements to Jammu from Srinagar and East Punjab Area to enable a force to be sent for the relief of the State Force garrisons. The fate of Mirpur was sealed; Poonch, Naushahra, Jhangar and Kotli were, however, to hold out against tremendous odds and to be relieved by the Indian troops.
Meanwhile the Royal Indian Air Force did whatever was possible to help the hard pressed garrisons. On 13 November, the Tempests and Spitfires carried out offensive reconnaissance of Poonch-Mirpur area. Acting on ground signs displayed by the State forces, enemy positions were attacked with good results in and around Mirpur, Palandri and near Kotli. About twenty trucks seen on the eastern edge of the tower of the town of Mirpur were bombed. During one of these reconnaissances, an enemy concentration, about 250 strong, was observed west of the burnt town of Bhimbar and was successfully attacked by two Tempests.
While the Indian Air Force gave some support to the State Force garrisons, Brigadier Paranjape, Commander 50 Para Bde, made preparations to move troops to Akhnoor as a prelude to the advance to Kotli. He ordered two platoons of 1 Patiala and a detachment of 7 Light Cavalry to reconnoitre road Beri Pattan-Naushahra at 0730 hours on 11 November. The reconnaissance patrol for Beri Pattan reported bridge near milestone 36 broken. Diversion of the mechanical transport was not possible. The patrol advanced further on foot and met a party of hostiles 3 km short of Beri Pattan. Fire was exchanged. Two hostiles were killed and three wounded. The hostiles withdrew towards Beri Pattan and hills to the north.
On 12 November Brigadier Paranjape ordered 1 Patiala, supported a Squadron 7 Light Cavalry, two platoons 1 Mahar (MG), and one by clearing all company 33 Field Ambulance, to move to Jhangar, clearing all opposition on the way, with a view to relieving garrisons at Mirpur and Kotli. The operation was to be carried out in two phases.
Phase I
One company 1 Patiala and one troop 7 Light Cavalry were to advance from Jammu at 040 hours on 13 November and prepare diversion for the rest of the force to cross Nala near milestone 36.
Phase II
The rest of the force was to start from Jammu at 0600 hours on 13 November, cross Nala near milestone 36 by the diversion prepared for them, cross the river near Beri Pattan, and aim at getting to Jhangar as fast as possible.
At 1830 hours on 12 November the reconnaissance patrol of 1 Patiala returned from Beri Pattan to Jammu and reported that the road at Beri Pattan had been blown up and that enemy was occupying bridge heights from Beri Pattan along the route to Naushahra. Major-General Kalwant Singh, Group Captain Mehar Singh, and Brigadier Y.S.Paranjape reviewed the situation and it was decided to cancel the orders to 1 Patiala to advance to Jhangar. Instead 1 Patiala and one troop 7 Light Cavalry were ordered to move fromJammu at 0900 hours on 13 November and concentrate at Akhnoor. On arrival at Akhnoor the force was to patrol the area particularly along the road to Beri Pattan.
The force left Jammu at 0900 hours on 13 November and arrived at Akhnoor at 1140 hours. Thus at the close of 13 November 50 Para Brigade had advanced to Akhnoor, only about 30 km from Jammu.
STRATEGIC PLANNING
The capture of Uri on 13 November by Indian troops ended the first phase of the operations in Kashmir.To decide on the future course of action, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet held a meeting on 14 November and conveyed the following instructions to Army Head- quarters:-
(1) It was of vital importance to deny the whole stretch of the Jhelum valley road to tribal ingress into Kashmir.
(2) After this had been properly effected, it was necessary to begin replacing Indian Army personnel by State troops and police in order to concentrate them progressively in and around Srinagar. This concentration was to be a prelude to a general and sustained withdrawal to India, as the demands for aid to the civil power in Kashmir lessened.
(3) In view of this and the poor flying conditions for air transport during the winter it was desirable that the Jammu-Banihal- Srinagar road should be kept open, if possible.
(4) It was necessary to establish such a force in Jammu as was required to give aid to the civil power, to suppress disorderly elements and to protect the minority communities.
( 5) lt was further necessary to despatch small mobile columns to relieve and evacuate beleaguered garrisons near to the Jammu-Punch-Uri road. These columns were also to evacuate non-Muslims living in close proximity to the road, if their lives were endangered.
(6) Lastly no effort in aid of the civil power over and above that in serial number (v) was to be embarked upon in Poonch, because the advent of winter, and lack of means, rendered winter action impossible.
In short the role of the Indian troops was to be limited to the two-fold task of securing the Jhelum valley road and evacuating beleaguered garrisons near the Jammu-Punch-Uri road.
To be continued……….