While Army Headquarters was finalising the future plans, the situation in Jammu and Kashmir appeared fairly well stabilised. Enemy sniping continued, however, and local skirmishes were a regular feature of the limited operations which lasted from 27 November to 9 December. From 10 December, the tempo of activity increased. The enemy became more aggressive and directed his attacks against the vulnerable Indian line of communication (Jammu-Jhangar), culminating in his capture of Jhangar on 24 December and the fierce but unsuccessful attack on Naushahra on 26 December. Indian efforts were largely concentrated on consolidating the position at Uri, warding off enemy attacks on Poonch and guarding the vulnerable line of communication.

 

 

 

 

Some 4000 to 6000 raiders were estimated to be operating in Uri sector. Many wore serge battle-dress and the force was reported to include some men from Pakistan's South Waziristan Scouts. The methods employed by these men, including their system of defences, indicated that they had been trained and were being led by professional soldiers They employed a large number of 3-inch mortars. 161 Infantry Brigade held in strength the forward position at Uri. The following troops constituted the garrison of Uri.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Some re-grouping of the Uri garrison was carried out and the defence of the perimeter strengthened 1 Sikh was withdrawn from the perimeter into reserve, and 4 Kumaon took their place towards the end of November 1947. 2 Dogra was spread along the line of communication from Baramulla to Uri. Srinagar garrison consisted of 6 Rajputana Rifles and odds and ends of rear parties of 161 Infantry Brigade and State Force elements in the Badambagh Cantonment.

 

 

4 Kumaon manned the piquets at Uri As there was a concentration of about a thousand enemy in the area Gohalan-Thajal, the picquets were mainly on the ridge which led south to Sank. D company had picquets named Jitter and Jitterbug, while still further south B company manned the forward picquet called Diamond. It was the forward picquet of Diamond on the Sank ridge which had to bear the brunt of enemy attacks. On 1 December 1947 the enemy attacked this picquet, the attack lasted from 1630 hours to 1930 hours, but was repulsed, with 25 hostiles killed and 25 wounded. The defenders lost one Naik and one Sepoy was wounded On 6 December, enemy switched the attack to a picquet across the Jhelum. The enemy was engaged by medium machine guns and dispersed. Following up this success, A company manning this picquet sent out on 8 December a fighting patrol to the village Mukdam Sayidan.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

After the engagement at Bhatgiran, enemy continued his pressure on the piquets, especially Jitter and Jitterbug. On 13 December, the picquet Jitterbug was jittered by a small enemy party. After an exchange of small arms fire the raiders melted away. Next day a platoon attacked picquet Jitter. The raiders bumped against booby traps, suffered casualties and retired in confusion. Undeterred by this failure, one company of hostiles renewed the attack on picquet Jitter on 15 December. They were mortared and machine gunned and dispersed .There was then a lull for about three days, On 19 December approximately 60 hostiles attacked both the picquets, Jitter and Jitterbug. After an engagement, which lasted for twenty minutes, they retired in confusion.

 

 

Some reorganisation of 161 Brigade then took place. As the fighting efficiency of 1 Sikh had suffered due to heavy losses in the engagement at Bhatgiran, the battalion was relieved by 6 Rajputana Rifles and moved to Srinagar for rest. The relief was completed by 2 December, although one of the companies was still detained at Baramulla Srinagar garrison as such was dissolved and Colonel Harbakhsh Singh took over the command of 1 Sikh, in addition to carrying out the duties of Station Commander, Srinagar.

 

 

 

 

The Poonch garrison, consisting of approximately 2000 State Force troops, had been reinforced by 1 (Para) Kumaon (less one com- pany) in November 1947. On 10 December, the Poonch garrison was set up as a brigade to be known as Poonch Brigade. The estimated strength of the enemy in the Poonch sector was about 3000. The use of automatics and mortars by the hostiles liberally almost every day indicated that they were receiving a regular supply of ammunition. Intelligence reports revealed that they were bringing the ammunition over the Lachman Pattan bridge, west of Palandri. The main approaches to Poonch open to the raiders were two, i.e , Palandri-Poonch track and Garhi-Bagh route, the latter was reported fit for mechanical transport.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On 14 December the Dakotas flew 1 sorties from Jammu to Poonch, carrying small arms, ammunition and supplies weighing about 29,940 kg. The returning aircraft carried from Poonch to Jammu 35 civilian casualties and 80 sick State Force troops. Henceforth the Dakotas were almost continuously employed, carrying food and ammunition supplies from Jammu to Poonch. The weather, however, was not always kind, rain often rendered Jammu airfield unserviceable but even this could not deter the RIAF from its momentous task and, as an alternative, supplies were earned from Amritsar.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

After the evacuation of Kotli at the close of November 1947, 50 Para Brigade concentrated at Naushahra, 1/2 Punjab was however left at Jhangar with the following under command.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The commander of 1/2 Punjab took steps to site piquets to command the approaches to Jhangar from Mirpur and Kotli. The holding of Pir Matals ridge was of the utmost importance to meet the enemy threat from Mirpur. Hence one company with two medium machine guns and a detachment of mortars was positioned there. Another company was put on its flank at a lower height, but on the same line of ridges which stretched towards Naushahra. The remaining two companies were scattered all round on piquets which numbered about ten. Most of these picquets were on the ridge which commanded the approaches to Jhangar from Kotli. Unfortunately the ground did not afford opportunities for these piquets to be inter-supporting. The distance between them varied from 450 metres to 720 metres.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Having been successful in blocking the road Naushahra-Jhangar and preventing reinforcements, enemy attacked Jhangar in great strength in the morning of 24 December. The first attackcame in from the south-west at 0630 hours and was carried out with great determination by a force of 2000. The weak company holding the position on the Pir Matalsi ridge, unprotected by barbed wire, was over-run by the large number of attackers, in spite of scores of them falling down due to fire from the valiant defenders. They came in wave after wave with complete disregard to casualties. The machine gunners worked havoc, but they were cut to pieces while still firing the guns.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Offensive air support was not possible on 24 December due to bad weather, as a result of which the Tempests at Jammu were grounded. Offensive air support was given on 25 December, from Jammu Ammunition dumps and enemy concentrations were fiercely strafed and bombed, which undoubtedly blunted the edge of further attacks.

 

 

The loss of Jhangar was a serious setback Indian casualties in men and material were heavy. Two officers and 58 Other Ranks were killed, three officers, two Junior Commissioned Officers and 51 Other Ranks were wounded, and 42 Other Ranks were reported missing Equipment lost in action included five 3-inch mortars, four medium machine guns, fourteen light machine guns, twelve 2-inch mortars, seventy rifles, four armoured cars and a number of other vehicles The tragic story of the loss of Jhangar is, however, illuminated by the reckless heroism of a handful of machine gunners (a platoon of 1 Mahar) who stuck to their posts and continued to fire and take heavy toll of the enemy until they were overwhelmed and cut to pieces.